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December 17, 1980 is a remarkable date for those interested in
either quality of government or, more particularly, evolution of the
Federal Trade Commission's sense of the unfair.' On that day, the
five Commissioners then in office2 purported to renounce Commis-
sion reliance on what they apparently regarded as a non-exclusive
substantive rule of decision concerning the content of their enabling
act's use of "unfair . . .acts or practices."3 That renounced can be
said to possess the cachet of Supreme Court approval by reason of a
unanimous opinion in FTC. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.4 (S&H).
* A.B. 1951, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1956, LL.M. (Trade Regulation) 1957,
New York University; Professor, Dickinson School of Law. Professor Maher currently serves
the Banking & Business Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association as chairperson of its
antitrust committee and as a member of its committee for reform and recodification of Penn-
sylvania's corporation and partnership laws. The author gratefully acknowledges the insights
and many contributions of Marcia A. Binder, J.D. June 1982, Dickinson School of Law.
I. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (sometimes hereinafter referred
to as FTCA) now provides that "lu]nfair methods of competition in or affecting competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1981). Section 5(a)(2) of the Act now pro-
vides that the Commission is "empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations, except [specified classes of otherwise regulated enterprises] from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. 1981).
2. In December 1980 the incumbent Commissioners were the Honorable Patricia P.
Bailey, David A. Clanton, Paul Rand Dixon, Michael Pertschuk, and Robert Pitofsky. Com-
missioner Pertschuk was then F.T.C. Chairman.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1981). The Commission is authorized as the overall en-
forcement agency to prescribe rules and general statements of policy. 15 U.S.C. § 607 (1976).
4. 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972). Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in
either consideration or decision of the matter. At the time of the S&H decision, § 5(a)(l) of
FTCA provided, "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52
Stat. 111 (1938). Section 5(a)(6) then provided that the Commission was "empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations [excluding certain otherwise regu-
lated enterprises] from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111, 111-
12 (1938). See note I supra for current version of these provisions. The ponderously cap-
Whether this inference is correct is open to inquiry.' In any event,
the Commissioners apparently accepted the thesis. The vehicle for
renouncing what they described as "the third S & H standard" was a
letter addressed to the then ranking majority and minority members
of the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation.6
Since the Commission and its Commissioners draw their au-
thority and obligations from enabling legislation, neither the Com-
mission nor any set of incumbent Commissioners can add to or
subtract from congressional mandates. This does not, however, ig-
nore a need common to all agencies burdened with prosecutorial
functions for priority allocations in context of current appropria-
tions. Nonetheless, decisions to devote prosecutorial resources to
targets deemed more demanding than others are far from equivalent
to purporting to abandon a rule of substantive decision endorsed by
higher authority. Assuming good faith, assignment of priorities
hopefully reflects enlightened use of common sense by prosecutors-
upon which use we all rely 7-and practical management of appro-
priations inadequate to fully address responsibilities.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is but one prototype of
federal agencies entrusted with rulemaking, prosecutorial, and judi-
cial functions. To the extent FTC has an obligation not only to ad-
dress unfair practices in the concrete but also judicial authority to
characterize such practices through generation and application of
substantive rules of decision, Commissioners acting jointly or sever-
ally would seem derelict if they knowingly fail to exercise such au-
thority in proper circumstances. Purporting to abandon a
substantive test educed before and allegedly adopted by the Supreme
Court evokes wonderment regarding what are most charitably de-
scribed as proprieties. An inferior federal court certainly has no
ability to foreswear future application of a substantive rule of deci-
sion endorsed by the highest court. Do FTC Commissioners have
such ability? Of course they do not. Neither entrustment with au-
thority nor reliance on presumed expertise to address the unfair
either on a case-by-case basis or through rulemaking8 can be re-
tioned Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975), broadened Commission jurisdiction to matters "af-
fecting commerce."
5. See text accompanying notes 165-95 infra.
6. Letter from Chairman and Commissioners of Federal Trade Commission to the
Honorable Wendall H. Ford and John C. Danforth, United States Senators 12 (Dec. 17, 1980)
(available in offices of the Dickinson Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Letter]. See also Com-
panion statement on the Commission's consumer unfairness jurisdiction signed by Carol M.
Thomas, Secretary of the Commission (December 17, 1980). The letter warned that individual
Commissioners may not endorse particulars in the companion statement. Letter, supra, at 3.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)-(b) (Supp. 1981). The Commission received explicit authority to
garded as the equivalent of the entruster's undoubted power unilat-
erally to contract the scope of the delegate's power. Unlike the
common-law agent, the statutory delegate is not a negotiant of its
scope of authority.
Since the renouncing Commissioners were sophisticates, it is
difficult to conceive of their indulgence in the belief that their letter
constituted an organic act of the Commission, or that they could
contract the law via correspondence with individual albeit interested
and responsible legislators, or that subsequent Commissioners could
be bound by the renunciation. If a "third S & H standard" achieved
status as a rule of law, it will remain viable despite contemporaneous
quasi-judicial office holders' extra-judicial renunciation of its use.
Perhaps no intentional deception was involved. Nevertheless, one
must fear that concerned legislators, the bar, or the regulated may be
misled to their ultimately material but qualitatively differing embar-
rassments. The signing Commissioners could not have intended
such an unfair result.
Neither the controversy generated in recent years by allegations
of Commission arrogations and staff arrogance nor minor wing-clip-
ping experienced by the Commission earlier in 19809 would impel a
Machiavellian bipartisan endeavor to deflect serious reformation ef-
forts through ineffective renunciation of a substantive rule of deci-
sion-and an implicit abdication of duty-by officers who
acknowledge the rule and believe in the duty. Could it be that no
one seriously believed that such a rule existed? It would not seem so.
Otherwise, the Commissioners' use of "the third S & H standard"
phrase would be deception, which is even more inconceivable than
innocent preparation for an unfair effect.
What compelled these words of renunciation? By definition, it
is impossible to remark the mental processes of any one or more
Commissioners. Context for the letter of renunciation was provided
by the Consumer Subcommittee's continuing interest in charges that
the Commission was abusing undoubted power to address demon-
promulgate substantive trade regulation rules in 1975. 88 Stat. 2193 (1975). Such rules are not
new. Section 6(g) of the original enactment gave FTC power "[flrom time to time to classify
corporations and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this act." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 722 (1914). Section 6 was
largely devoted to the Commision's role as a fact-gatherer concerning the national economy.
The rulemaking power was not explicitly linked to the Commission's role under section 5 vis-
a-vis unfair methods of competition. Nevertheless, the Commission used the section 6 crypti-
cism as a springboard for various substantive regulations. These exercises usually addressed
merchandising methods. Such rules were challenged on the theory that FTCA contained
neither authority nor standards for FTC to engage in such promulgations. See, e.g., National
Petroleum Ref. Ass'n. v. F.T.C., 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
9. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 2, 94
Stat. 374 (1980).
strably unfair practices injurious to consumers or competition.' °
Use of the word "unfair" has never been peculiar to FTC or
administrative practice."l The heart of the Trade Commission Act is
in its section 5(a): "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce are hereby declared unlawful."' 2 This central language
has remained unchanged in substantive particulars '
3 since 1938. 14
Efforts to maximize Commission impact are not surprising. Similar
efforts are common among federal or state agencies. Successive ver-
sions of the FTC charter, however, have been exceptional for their
breadth and occasionally courts have accommodated-or arguably
led-the FTC to quantum leaps 5 concerning the discretion it enjoys.
These leaps were not universally acclaimed.
Lower federal courts interpreted and implemented the language
of the S& H decision in its broadest sense. 16 Judicial interpretations
combined with various factors to produce a crescendo of com-
plaints." These factors include the sweep of some portions of the
Magnusson-Moss "Improvements" of 1975,18 maneuverings of Com-
mission personnel since S & H and the 1975 Act, and statements of
10. See generally Letter, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); F.T.C. v. Keppel &
Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); F.T.C. v. Curtis
Publ. Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); F.T.C. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 568 (1923); F.T.C. v.
Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1981).
13. The Magnuson-Moss improvements of 1975 extended jurisdictional reach of the
Commission to embrace activities merely affecting commerce. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193.
14. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
15. See text accompanying notes 132-36, 140-56, and 161-76 infra for development of
"antitrust by analogy," "antitrust of incipiency," and the curious procedural context for FTC's
victory in S&H.
16. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Spiegel, Inc., 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976); Heater v. F.T.C., 503
F.2d 321, 322-23 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum).
17. See, e.g., JS&A GROUP, INC., THE MONSTER THAT EATS BUSINESS (1981); JS&A
GROUP, INC., BLOW YOUR KNEE CAPS OFF (1979); Meyer, Police State Tactics, PENTHOUSE,
August 1981, at 53; Sugarman, The Government Attack on Free Enterprise, PENTHOUSE, August
1980, at 104. See also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., UNFAIRNESS: VIEWS ON UNFAIR ACTS AND PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT (Comm. Print 1980 [hereinafter cited as UNFAIRNESS
COMM. PRINT].
18. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).
19. See, e.g., the curious matter of assigning and reassigning hearing officers in "the Ce-
reals Case," UNFAIRNESS COMM. PRINT, supra note 17, at 58-64; revelations concerning Com-
mission staff's "belief system," FTC, CONSUMER INFORMATION REMEDIES (1979). See also
UNFAIRNESS COMM. PRINT, supra note 17; Statement of Reason for Proposed Trade Regula-
tion Rule on Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975); Statement of Reason for the Pro-
posed Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry, 40 Fed. Reg. 39,904-39,905 (1975).
According to former Chairman Pertschuk, FTC personnel were working simultaneously
on fifteen industry-wide regulations when pressure to amend the Act came to a head. Atlanta
Constitution, Nov. 9, 1981, at 3-C, col. 3-4.
persons identified with Commission policy-setting.20 For those who
remember the "Chicken Case"' 2' and the arguments that undercut
the National Recovery Administration (NRA),22 some of these com-
plaints sound familiar.
Despite serious scholars' reservations concerning viability of a
requirement that congressional delegations of power must be accom-
panied by fairly definite standards limiting the delegate's scope of
authority,2 3 considerable political doubt remains that explicit delega-
tion of power to address the commercially unfair includes power to
create regimes that Commission personnel of a time perceive as
proper to reorienting social structures deemed to be less than achiev-
ably fair to one or more levels of distribution and consumption. A
great difference exists between that which is demonstrably unfair in
the concrete and that which is less than ideally fair or is otherwise
improveable in any -given social advocate's eyes. Classically, while
recognition and amelioration of unfairness in the concrete can be left
to courts or properly instructed delegates, it is peculiarly the job of
Congress, as the people's sole legislative delegate, to address adjust-
ment of societal structures to better serve the polity as a whole.24
20. [Tlhere is a widespread perception that antitrust has failed to deal significantly
with significant problems. . . . There appears a failure ofphilosophy, a failure of
resources, a failure of political coverage, of will. There is a sense abroad that federal
antitrust cases have not focused with enough frequency or intensity on the most im-
portant questions. . . . Enforcement agencies have often been lacking in historical
perspective or imagination. Tending to think only like litigators or to restrict them-
selves to a narrow allocative efficiency approach to economics, they have/ailed. . . in
• ..attempting through enforcement initiatives and the power of information to
bring the structure and behavior of. . .the economy itself more into line with the
nation's democratic political and social ideals. . . . We are contemplating a number
of test cases. . .. when the appropriate facts are presented, to resolve the breadth of
Section 5.
Remarks of FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk, New England Antitrust Conference, in Bos-
ton, Nov. 24, 1977, reported in 840 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I F-4. See also
letter from then FTC Chairman Pertschuk to Food and Drug Commissioner in which the
Commission's "logical process" in a rulemaking proceeding is described as starting from the
idea that "children's advertising is inherently unfair." Letter, supra note 6, at 6 n. 16. In Feb-
ruary 1979, then Chairman Pertschuk announced that the Commission "is dedicated to finding
and remedying vestigial and unjustifiable restrictions on the market for professional services."
Pertschuk, Viewpoint: Needs and Licenses, 3 REGULATIONS 14, 16 (1979). Eplaining availabil-
ity to editorial writers but not reporters during a 1980 campaign to "save" FTC, Mr. Pertschuk
is alleged to have observed, "For some time it had been the unflattering consensus of my
colleagues on the commission that a silent, if not invisible, chairman was the most potent
antidote to charges of intemperate, biased commission leadership. I knew, but forgot, that
FTC served two masters--the public interest and Congress. . . . The public interest was a
malleable absentee master, but the Congress held the whip." ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 16,
1981, at 12 (emphasis added).
21. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Pan-
ama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); notes 187-90 infra.
22. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). See notes 79-81
and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36 (1972); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 42-47 (1976).
24. The author admits the following biases: Bureaucratic government of a nation of 200
million is inescapable even though, according to then Governor Ronald Reagan, government
"should do only those things that people cannot do for themselves." Address by Hon. Ronald
B. Concern About FTC
With notable exceptions,25 Commission personnel rarely ex-
press desires to reshape societal structures. Although there have
been charges of arrogance,26 the Commission does not suffer remark-
ably from unfortunate personnel recruitment and retention. Yet,
there are those innocent or reactionary enough to think that custodi-
ans of public power have a special duty not only to avoid arrogance
but also to resist temptations to use powers given in trust to twist
public structures to suit personal albeit well-intentioned
predilections.
The purpose of this article is neither to endorse nor even to ex-
plore charges that arrogance has been pandemic within FTC.
Neither does this article endorse any theory that the Commission has
been used by ideologues who, although intent on creating what they
conceive to be a fairer society, are resistant to carrying the burden of
proving unfairness of that sought to be reformed. Nor does it en-
dorse a recurring rumor that Commissioners of recent years in-
structed staff personnel to bring cases calculated to test the extreme
limits of FTC power.
Reagan (June 23, 1971). While Jefferson properly taught that the "natural progress of things is
for liberty to yield and government to gain ground", this is not a counsel of despair but of
caution. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), quoted
in SPEAKER'S LIFETIME LIBRARY 112 (L. Spinnard & T. Spinnard eds. 1979). Congress is the
sole federal legislative delegate of the people. Subdelegation of legislative power and creation
of quasi-judicial power necessarily attenuate political accountability but recognition of such an
effect should accentuate rather than dampen courts' attention to scopes of authority conferred
on subdelegates. The human who can perform the role of a Platonic guardian has not been
born. The supremacy of the pe6ple and their constitutional process are endangered by encour-
aging administrators to become convinced of their superior wisdom for, when they are wrong,
it is the people who pay the price with scant likelikood of imposing accountability. Adminis-
trative agencies were created for assigned purposes and given authority that modern manage-
ment theorists would equate with "management by objectives" but sharp definition of
agencies' scopes of authority is indispensable to good government. The courts long have erred
in failing to exact strict accountability from administrators who, by virtue of their numbers
and government's complexity, are not only beyond immediate accountability to but are fre-
quently unknown by the people. Appropriations and other congressional committees' some-
time attendance, for whatever reason, to administrative excess is not a satisfactory check on
over-reaching when courts routinely confuse deference to administrative expertise with a blank
check for subdelegates to define their own scope of authority.
25. "We will also be looking at industries whose structure may facilitate anticompetitive
behavior or poor market performance. We are contemplating test cases . . . to resolve the
breadth of section 5." Remarks of FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk, New England Antitrust
Conference, in Boston, Nov. 24, 1977, in 840 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I, F-3.
"Our undertaking will have a profound impact on a major segment of industry and the media
and upon the environment of the child and the family." Michael Pertschuk, heralding a pro-
posed trade regulation of advertising oriented to children, quoted in FTC Launches Rulemaking
on Children's TVAdvertising [1978] 853 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-15. Mr.
Pertschuk, commenting in context of recent replacement as Chairman of FTC, stated, "As a
minority, I see no dearth of opportunities for impassioned dissent." The Sun, Nov. 9, 1981, at
A9, col. 1. Mr. Pertschuk, referring to the Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
claimed that Congress "had been sufficiently intimidated, denatured or bribed to stand aside
or join the revolt." Id One assumes that, if Commissioner Pertschuk truly made the last
statement, he had a provable data base.
26. See, e.g., JS&A GROUP, INC., THE MONSTER THAT EATS BUSINESS (1981).
Rather, this article looks to the potencies implicit in ideologues
becoming powerful FTC insiders and maintains that if well or
poorly intentioned insiders can routinely misuse power with which
the Commission is entrusted, it is no answer that courts may inter-
vene. The situation demands correction, which can be supplied
through amendment of the statute. A need for correction is not pe-
culiar to FTC. However, to the degree that reinstitution of a respon-
sible but not paternalistic bureaucratic spirit at FTC is appropriate,
the Commission may be a prototype for reorienting comparable
agencies to serve the people and the rule of law.
While expressions of fear that FTC's current power is symto-
matic of regression from government of laws to the dreaded arbitrar-
iness of government of unaccountable men-of-the-moment are not
commonplace, this fear is an unstated premise of proposals to limit
either the Commission's power or occasions for its exercise. There
have been explicit reservations about incursions on first amendment
rights. There continue to be expressions of a need for the governed
and those who counsel them to know the groundrules. These expres-
sions prompt memories of President Wilson's aspirations for a Trade
Commission.27
The Commissioners' purported renunciation" did not concede
either institutional arrogation of power, or staff arrogance in any
particulars, or even the potency for abuse. Yet, if that renounced is
indeed a standard acknowledged by the Supreme Court, the stan-
dard cannot be repudiated by Commissioners and corrective action
is evoked. Alternatively, if the Commissioners' representation of the
Supreme Court's holding in S & H is incorrect, corrective action is
necessary lest the other "S & H standards" mislead. In either event,
because of the method of renunciation chosen by the Commission-
ers, the solution is political. Does the renounced standard constitute
a substantive rule of decision? Response demands an historical re-
view of the powers conceded to and exercised by the Commission.
II. History of the Federal Trade Commission Act
A. The 19144act
Endorsing the bill that ultimately became the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA), President Wilson observed, "Nothing
hampers business like uncertainty, nothing daunts or discourages it
like the necessity to take chances, to run the risk of falling under
condemnation of the law before it can make sure just what the law
27. See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
is."" A significant portion of the commercial sector reputedly per-
ceived enforcement of the Sherman Act as sufficiently erratic to in-
duce "a climate of legal uncertainty in which effective business
planning was impossible .. ."3o Wilson perceived that the com-
mercial sector desired "the advice, the definite guidance, and infor-
mation which can be supplied by an administrative body, an
Interstate Trade Commission."31 Wilson also conceived of the
agency as a forum in which to afford "justice to business where the
processes of the courts or the natural forces of correction outside of
the courts are inadequate to adjust the remedy to the wrong in a way
which meets all the equities and circumstances of the case."32 The
essence of the enactment sounded more of prosecution than of
guidance.
As originally enacted, section 5(a) of the FTCA provided that
"[ulnfair methods of competition in commerce [were] . ..declared
unlawful. '3 3 Section 5(b) of the Act directed that, when "it shall
appear . . . that a proceeding . . . would be to the interest of the
public," an administrative proceeding should be instituted against
any "person, partnership, or corporation" reasonably believed to
have used an unfair method. If the change proved to be accurate,
the Commission would order respondent to "cease and desist from
the violation of the law."' 34 Although prosecutorial and judicial roles
were assigned to the new agency, Congress did not explicitly dele-
gate generalized rulemaking power.
A crypticism in section 6(g), upon which much weight was ulti-
mately placed, empowered the Commission "from time to time to
classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the pur-
pose of carrying out the provisions of this act."35 Content of "unfair
methods of competition" was left undefined. There was a clear legis-
lative indisposition to say merely "unfair competition. ' 36 This re-
29. 83 CoNG. REC. 546 (1938), reprintedin C. DUNN, WHEELER-LEA ACT, A STATEMENT
OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 201 (1938) [hereinafter cited as C. DUNN].
30. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule of Part 408, Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in relation to Health Hazards of Smoking,
29 Fed. Reg. 8348 (1964).
31. 83 CONG. REC. 546 (1938) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 201. For many
years, one of the Commission's principal components was a Bureau of Industry Guidance. It
succumbed to reorganizations in 1970 and 1973. 35 Fed. Reg. 10627-10629 (1970); 38 Fed.
Reg. 32536 (1973). By definition, to the degree such a unit is successful in encouraging as
opposed to compelling compliance, there are fewer pelts to display when it is time to seek
appropriations and the unit becomes an easy victim of purely cost-benefit analyses of agency
effectiveness.
32. Id
33. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914).
34. Id at 720.
35. Id at 722. See text accompanying notes 236-37 infra.
36. F.T.C. v. Keppel & Bros. Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 311-12 n.2 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1132,
63 Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). See Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1936:
Hearings on S. 3744 before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
flected a fear that use of such a well-recognized term would imply
limitation of the Commission's prosecutorial and judicial scope to
conduct characterized as unfair competition at common law.37
Within six years of the Act's passage, the Supreme Court ob-
served in F T C. v. Gratz38 that the term "unfair methods of competi-
tion" is "clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as
opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad
faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against public policy because of
their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create
monopoly."39 After another fourteen years, however, when the
Supreme Court decided FTC. v. Keppel, 40 it refused to "intimate
either that the statute does not authorize the prohibition of other and
hitherto unknown methods of competition or, on the other hand,
that the Commission may prohibit every unethical competitive prac-
tice regardless of its particular character or consequences. 4 1
Justice Brandeis wrote for the majority in Keppel. He had dis-
sented from Gratz, maintaining that
[w]hat § 5 declares unlawful is not unfair competition. That had
been unlawful before. What the section made unlawful were 'un-
fair methods of competition'; ... the method or means by which
an unfair act milht be accomplished .... The purpose was to
prevent any unfair method ... used by any concern from becom-
ing its general practice .... It was only by stopping its use
before it became a general practice, that the apprehended effect of
.. . supressing competition by destroying rivals could be
averted.
Brandeis' views were the seed for an awesome flowering in later de-
cades. 43 Before looking to development of the Commission's juris-
prudence of the unfair other aspects of the original Act demand
attention.
As indicated in the earlier paraphrase of the original section
5(b),44 decision to proceed with prosecution was keyed explicitly to
the Commission's perception that the public interest would be
served.45 That a given proceeding is in the public interest was held
(1936) (statement of Ewin L. Davis, member of F.T.C.), reprinted in C. DUNN supra note 29, at
371.
37. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on S, 3744 before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (statement of Ewin L.
Davis, member of F.T.C.) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 37. See also text accompa-
nying note 42 infra.
38. 253 U.S. 421 (1921).
39. Id at 427 (emphasis added).
40. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
41. Id at 314.
42. 253 U.S. at 441-42. It is often remarked that Brandeis counseled President Wilson
concerning creation of the Commission.
43. See text accompanying notes 138-54 infra.
44. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
by the Supreme Court to be a jurisdictional fact subject to judicial
review.46
While the original Act granted authority to the Commission to
issue cease and desist orders,47 the Commission lacked explicit au-
thority to issue preliminary injunctions, impose penalties, or direct
restitution or other affirmative action. Commission orders were sub-
ject to review in federal appellate courts.
48
Distinct from its duty to address "unfair methods of competi-
tion," the Commission was charged with maintaining an overview of
all corporate participants in interstate commerce except banks and
federally regulated common carriers.49 Section 6(b) of the Act gave
the Commission power to require that corporations file "annual or
special . . . reports or answers in writing to specific questions, fur-
nishing. . . such information. . . as to the organization, business,
conduct, practices, management, and relation to other individu-
als."5 Neither link nor separator, explicit or implicit, came between
this power and the Commission's prosecutorial role.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,5' the Supreme Court
styled the Commission as a "legislative or judicial aid" and said that
investigations under section 6 are performed "as a legislative
agency."52 Not only data collection but also overhead intensification
and other coercive potentials implicit in free-ranging authority are
46. In a palming-off case, the Supreme Court taught,
A complaint may be filed only 'if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public.' This requirement is not
satisfied by proof that there has been misapprehension and confusion on the part of
purchasers, or even that they have been deceived,-the evidence commonly adduced by
the plaintiff in 'passing off' cases in order to establish the alleged private wrong. It is
true that in suits by private traders to enjoin unfair competition by 'passing off,' proof
that the public is deceived is an essential element of the cause of action. This proof is
necessary only because otherwise the plaintiff has not suffered an injury. There, protec-
tion of the public is an incident of the enforcement of a private right. But to justify the
Commission in filing a complaint under § 5, the purpose must be protection of the public.
F.T.C. v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 1922 (emphasis added). The importance of this concept has down-
graded as courts have become less rigorous about a clear showing of public interest. See, e.g.,
F.T.C. v. Real Prod. Corp., 90 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1937). Nevertheless, the imposition on
FTC has not been excised by legislative action and Klesner has not been overruled.
As late as 1936, the Commission acknowledged need for a fact finding concerning public
interest. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act.: Hearings on S. 3744 before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (statement of R.E. Freer,
member of FTC) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 391. It would be interesting to see
what the Supreme Court, as presently constituted, would do with an argument that the public
interest is clearly not served by individualized FTC prosecutions of new theories when the
Commission now has explicit authority to promulgate trade regulation rules. Consider in con-
text of Francis Ford, Inc. v. F.T.C., 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914).
48. Even upon affirmation, a respondent could not be punished until a different court of
appeals ruled in a separate proceeding. See, e.g., Proper v. John Bene & Co., Inc., 295 F. 729,
731 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
49. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914).
50. Id at 721.
51. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
52. Id at 628.
obvious.53 Many years after passage of the original Act, when seek-
ing additional powers for the Commission, a Commissioner testified
that the Commission understood certain judicial precedents 54 to
mean "powers conferred upon the Commission by section 6 couldnot
be used in aid of a prosecution under section 5. . . .51 This assur-
ance56 was and is dubious.57
B. Prelude to the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938
FTC v. Gratz5" concerned a marketer of jute bagging and cot-
ton ties who refused to sell ties to anyone other than bagging custom-
ers. Respondent was tying, but neither monopoly nor dominance
was pleaded. The decision effectively marked out two spheres in
which unfair methods were to be addressed-practices "against pub-
licpolicy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or create monopoly" and practices "opposed to good morals
because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppres-
sion."59 In one sphere is conduct qualitatively prejudicial to the
competitive process. The second comprehends behavior that is rec-
* ognizably antisocial albeit not necessarily threatening to survival of
the competitive process. While use of the word "morals" may have
been unfortunate because of the possibility of theological implica-
tions and because the Court likely meant "ethics,"'6° retrospection
permits the thought that the Court's meaning was clear enough. Not
only threats to the competitive process itself but also actual or con-
structive fraud 61 in the market place were thought to be within the
Commission's competency to develop substantive rules of decision
provided interstate commerce was directly implicated.
53. In recent years, requests by Commission staff personnel for data to be used in con-
nection with preliminary inquiries have been modified by gratuitous references to §§ 6, 9 and
10 of the Act. This practice, of course, is not subject to the same scrutiny as the staff imposes
on others.
54. E.g., F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
55. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on S. 3744 before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (statement of R.E. Freer,
member of FTC) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 397.
56. The Commissioner offered the assurance in response to legislators' concerns about an
end run on the spirit of the fourth amendment. Id at 398-99.
57. See, e.g., text accompanying note 53 supra, concerning one form of request for data
addressed to those about whom the staff either has received a complaint or has been otherwise
sensitized. Presently, the author does not know whether the principle implicit in § 13 of the
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374, will
cause staff inquiries to be less deceptive.
58. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
59. Id at 427.
60. Use of either "morals" or "ethics" in positive law is troublesome. See the explicit and
implicit debates in T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); D. HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE
(1949): J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689).
61. For the purposes of this article, constructive fraud includes either misrepresentations
by even careless commission or omission of material fact, upon which innocent parties reason-
ably rely to their detriment, or knowing misuse of bargaining power unreasonably to coerce
decisions to buy or sell.
The Supreme Court's 1931 Raladam62 decision, however, termi-
nated the possibility that such an easy encapsulation of the Commis-
sion's prosecutorial jurisdiction could be adopted in the short or
medium term. Before what has become known as Raladam ,63 a
number of decisions discretely focused on deceptions, creation of cir-
cumstances having a potency to mislead, and bad faith.' Raladam I
concerned a deceptively marketed patent medicine having allegedly
dangerous potential. The Sixth Circuit ruled that FTC lacked juris-
diction since the "thing forbidden . . . is unfair competition. This
cannot exist unless there is competition, and there cannot be compe-
tition unless there is something" with which to compete.65  The
Supreme Court not only upheld this reasoning but elaborated that
the
paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from the
evils likely to result from the destruction of competition or the
restriction of it in a substantial degree .... [U]nfair trade meth-
ods are not per se unfair methods of competition ... [T]he unfair
methods must be such as injuriously affect or tend . . . to affect
the business of these competitors . . . [T]he trader whose methods
are .. unfair must have. . . rivals in trade whose business...
is likely to be. . .injured.66
This set the stage for the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938.67
Early in 1935, Senator Wheeler introduced a well-considered
bill that would have amended the heart of the Trade Commission
Act to provide that "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in or affecting
commerce are declared unlawful. ' 6 The language was identical to a
recommendation submitted by Commission personnel in 1934.69 It
took nearly four years and six bills7 before a far more elaborate
amendment of the Act was effected and until 1975 for the Commis-
62. F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
63. A distinction made appropriate by F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 142 (1942), in
which the Court announced that one of the objects of FTCA was to prevent potential injury by
stopping unfair methods of competition in their incipiency. Id at 152.
64. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
598 (1929); F.T.C. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1923); F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery
Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1922).
65. Raladam v. F.T.C., 42 F.2d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 1930).
66. 382 U.S. at 647-49.
67. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
68. S. 944, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 25.
69. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 46, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 26.
70. S. 944, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 24; S.
3744, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 35; H.R. 10385, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), reprintedin C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 102; H.R. 3143, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 110; H.R. 5854, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 114; S. 1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937),
reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 124.
sion to be given broad "affecting commerce" jurisdiction." The
principal avowed purpose of the 1934-38 proposals was to vitiate the
Raladam I requirement of at least potential injury to completion in
section 5(b) prosecutions. 7
Well before passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, the
Supreme Court's decision in F TC. v. Keppel & Bros., Inc. 73 some-
what undercut Raladam I Keppel addressed "unfair" use of a lot-
tery technique to merchandise candy to children."4 The Court not
only refused to "intimate that the statute" failed to "authorize the
prohibition of hitherto unknown methods of competition, ' 75 it in-
structed that
[n]either the language nor the history of the Act suggests that Con-
gress intended to confine the forbidden methods to fixed and un-
yielding categories. The common law afforded a definition of
unfair competition and, before the enactment of the. . .[F.T.C.]
...Act, the Sherman Act had laid its inhibitions upon combina-
tions to restrain or monopolize. . . commerce. . . .It would not
have been a difficult feat of draftsmanship to have restricted...
operation of the. . .[F.T.C.]. . .Act to those methods of compe-
tition in interstate commerce which are forbidden at common law
or which are likely to grow into violation of the Sherman Act, if
that had been the purpose of the legislation.76
Much of this is dicta since an adverse potential for competition could
be discerned.77 Hence, despite popular later attributions, Keppel
presented no technical need to undo Raladam I and Gratz' only
somewhat restrictive approach to Commission use of the "unfair.
78
Sometimes ignored in considering the meaningfulness of the
phrase "unfair methods of competition" in FTCA is the "Chicken
Case."' 79 The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) purported
to authorize a process whereby industry groups coordinated by the
NRA would generate codes of fair competition for ultimate submis-
sion to the President of the United States.80 Upon presidential ap-
proval of a code, violations were to occasion exposure to Trade
Commission address under section 5(b) of its enabling act.
In the "Chicken Case," the NIRA was attacked on the theory
that "fair competition" had been left undefined to the extent neces-
sary to provide an appropriately definite standard of delegation of
71. See note I supra. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193.
72. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 51, 54-56.
73. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
74. Id at 306-08.
75. Id at 314.
76. Id at 310.
77. Id at 314.
78. 253 U.S. at 421. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
79. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
80. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
authority to legislate. One Government argument was that since del-
egation to FTC of power to condemn "unfair methods of competi-
tion" had been sustained, there should be little difficulty in similarly
upholding promotion of the fair. This argument assumes that, in
given factual contexts, lines of demarcation separate the fair from
unfair and are recognizable through application of agencies' exper-
tise. The Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument.
Unfairness in competition has been predicated on acts ...
outside the ordinary course of business. . . [that] ... are tainted
by fraud, or coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law...
[I]n its widest range "unfair competition" does not reach the
objectives of the codes. . . authorized by the . . . Recovery Act.
The codes may. . . cover conduct which existing law condemns,
but they are not limited to conduct of that sort. . . . [We cannot]
• . . regard the [NRA codes'] "fair competition" as antithetical to
the [FTCA's] "unfair method of competition". . . . Rather, the
[NIRA's] purpose is . . . to authorize new and controlling
prohibitions through codes of law which would embrace what the
formulators would propose, and what the President would ap-
prove, as wise and beneficient measures for government of trades
and industries.
8 1
More than forty years removed from the pressures of the Great De-
pression and the New Deal, it is not too daring to wonder whether
the Court was indisposed either to accommodate what might have
been perceived as a drift to syndicalism or to sanction cartelization
of the American economy. In effect, the Court took the rare ap-
proach82 of holding that Congress had sought to abdicate rather than
to delegate its power to regulate commerce.83 Power to create the
good and beautiful was incapable of delegation whereas power to
recognize the unfair in concrete situations was competent of intelli-
gent delegation.
In the same early New Deal era, Congress passed the Securities
Act of 193384 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.85 The for-
mer's section 17(a) indicates that Congress knew how to address con-
structive fraud.86 Section 10(b) of the latter suggests that Congress
knew how to delegate power to characterize species of unfair market
81. 295 U.S. at 532-35 (emphasis added).
82. Esteemed writers concerning administrative law agree that the Court has only twice
invalidated an administrative scheme on the theory of constitutional inadequacy of congres-
sional delegation. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 28 (1972); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 39 (1976).
83. 295 U.S. at 535. See id at 552-53 (Cardozo, J., concurring). Justice Cardozo had
dissented from Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1934). In Schichier, Cardozo
belabored the difference between the Trade Commission condemning acts "tainted by fraud or
coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law" and NIRA authorization of regulation in
the interests of improving affected industries. 295 U.S. at 552-53.
84. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (Supp. 1981).
conduct.8 7 Notably, FTC was the original administrator of the 1933
Act and personalities identified with the Trade Commission were in-
strumental in developing the 1934 Act.88
This was the context for the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the
Trade Commission Act.
C. Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938
The 1938 amendments had two distinct thrusts. One was explic-
itly to burden FTC with jurisdiction over food, drug, and cosmetic
advertising. The second, more germane to this article, was substan-
tially to amend section 5 including amendment of its subsection (a)
to read as follows:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations ... [except certain other-
wise regulated industries] ... from using unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce.
8 9
Thus arose the potency for argument that non-deceptive unfair acts
or practices were within the Commission's ambit. Superfically, this
is not an unreasonable conclusion but nothing in the amendments
provided explicit hallmarks explaining the content of "unfair."
Section 4 of the Wheeler-Lea Act suggests that Congress had
the capacity to essay design of such benchmarks. The Act, for the
purposes of the food and drug jurisdiction, defined the term "false
advertising" as
an advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a
material respect; and in determining whether any advertisement is
misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things)
not only representations made or suggested by statement, word,
design, device, sound, or any combination thereof, but also the
extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in
the light of such representations or material with respect to conse-
quences which may result from the use of the commodity to which
the advertisement relates under the conditions proscribed in said
advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or
usual.90
Congress' failure to provide comparable guidance on the meaning of
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. 1981). The most famous product of such delegation was
modeled on § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and is found at 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1980).
88. See, e.g., Trade Commissioner Landis' testimony concerning a predecessor to § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MA-
HAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITY ACT OF 1933 & SECURITY EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at 21 (1973).
89. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
90. Id at 116.
unfair acts or practices may reflect an understanding that the concept
was self-evident.
It has been indicated that the legislative history is not informa-
tive.9" This is not altogether correct. In 1936, the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce reported that it was "of the opinion that the
Commission should have jurisdiction to restrain unfair or deceptive
acts or practices which deceive and defraud the public generally with-
out being put to the necessity of proving that the competitors of the
offender have suffered monetary damage."92
Furthermore, honoring the Klesner93 evocation of "public inter-
est"94 as a sine qua non for Commission jurisdiction, the Committee
observed,
The inevitably sound conclusion is that where it is not a question
of a purely private controversy, and where the acts and practices
are unfair or deceptive to the public generally, they should be
stopped regardless of their effect upon competitors. [This is] the
sole purpose and effect of the chief amendment to section 5.95
The Committee was remarking Senate Bill 3744, in which the first
paragraph was identical to the first paragraph of section 5 enacted
two years later by the Wheeler-Lea Act. The obvious point was to
abrogate Raladam Is focus on competitive injury rather than to en-
large the Commission's substantive power. Testifying before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Trade Commissioner
Erwin L. Davis said that the "only difference" from existing law ef-
fected by the proposed first paragraph of section 5(a) was "that it
would relieve us of the necessity of proving injury to competitors. 96
Referring to a circuit court reversal of a Commission order
against advertising's use of paid testimonials because the practice did
not involve misrepresentation or deceit,9 7 Commissioner Freer
opined that "the decision would have been the same under the pro-
posed amendment" 98 and stressed,
[It] is perfectly plain. . . that, when one. . . by any sort of un-
fair, or misleading, or deceptive, or fraudulent practice, induces
people to buy its products, who in the absence of such practices
would not buy it, to that extent it takes away businessfrom the
91. See, e.g., B. Keller & D. Rice, Market Place Unfairness: An Objective Basisfor Re-
stricting Commercial Speech to Children Within the Bounds of the First Amendment (1979),
reprinted in UNFAIRNESS COMM. PRINT, supra note 17.
92. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 52-53 (emphasis supplied).
93. F.T.C. v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
94. Id at 27-28.
95. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 53 (emphasis supplied).
96. 80 Cong. Rec. 6,436-37 (1936) reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 64.
97. F.T.C. v. Northam Warren Corp., 59 P.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1932).
98. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on S, 3744 before the
Senate Comm on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (statement of R.E. Freer,
member of FTC), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 393.
honest competitors and all other competitors. That is an obvious
thing, and yet you as reasonable men. . . can understand the dif-
ficulties and the trouble and the time and the expense involved in
undertaking to. . .prove those things.99
Commissioner Davis disclaimed intent or need to include oppressive
acts or practices in the amendatory language."l°  This disclaimer is
significant in light of later interpretations of the principal Wheeler-
Lea Amendment. On another occasion, when asked what would be
unfair but not deceptive, Commissioner Davis replied, "[T]he courts
have held commercial bribery is an unfair practice. They have held
that many other things are an unfair practice, and yet. . . not decep-
tive."' 0  He declined to state that "overcharging" that produces an
extraordinary profit would be unfair within the proposed
language. 
0 2
Thus, history reveals that both proponents of what became sec-
tion 5(a) and respected Trade Commissioners of the time carefully
avoided implying that the purpose of the amendatory language was
other than to avoid the proof-of-competition stricture of Raladam
L "o They laboriously described the substantive point of section 5(a)
as proscribing nothing other than trade restraints adversely affecting
competition, deceptive acts and practices, and other species of con-
duct demonstrably unfair and prejudicial to consumers or
competition.
Commissioner Davis emphasized this point in testimony before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Repre-
sentative Cole drew the Commissioner's attention to the central
Gratz teaching that "'unfair methods of competition' . . . are
clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as op-
posed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith,
fraud, or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dan-
gerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monop-
oly."' He asked if there should be some attempt to refine the
"rather broad language which you ask now be put in section 5.'"1
Commissioner Davis replied that the new language
is not materially different from what it was defined by the court in
99. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Hearings on S. 3744 before the
House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (statement of
Ewin L. Davis, Commissioner, FTC), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 410.
100. Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on H. 3143 before the
House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (statement of
Ewin L. Davis, FTC Commissioner), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 466 [hereinafter
cited as 1937 Hearings].
101. 1937 Hearings, supra note 100, reprinted in C. DuN, supra note 29, at 467.
102. Id
103. See text accompanying notes 95-101 supra.
104. 1937 Hearings, supra note 100, reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 473 (quoting
F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 426, 427 (1920)).
105. 1937 Hearings, supra note 100, reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 473.
the Gratz case, is it? . . The Commission has given this a great
deal of thought and. . . thinks that the language it proposes more
nearly conforms to what Congress has done and what the courts
have said than any other language it can devise to avoid the neces-
sity of having to always establish and prove competition.1 6
In April 1936, during debate on the Senate floor, Senator
Wheeler voiced a desire
to impress upon Senators that. . . the bill. . . does not fundamen-
tally change thepresent law excepting. . . as it gives the Commis-
sion the right to say to a person engaged in a practice complained
of, 'You must cease and desist from this practice, in the public
interest, notwithstanding noninjury to a competitor .107
Thus, the key to "unfair . . .acts or practices" was represented as
being in judicial precedent predating not only the eventual Wheeler-
Lea Amendments but Senate Bill 3744 as introduced "at the request
of the Federal Trade Commission."'' 0 8  That request was made as
early as December 1934.109 Interestingly, Keppel"I was handed
down on February 5, 1934 during the chain store investigation that
provided the vehicle for the Commission recommendation.II' In de-
bate, Senator Wheeler thanked Senator Copeland for announcing
his support for the bill based on a perception that it was not aimed at
"an honest concern" but one who markets goods "that are not at all
what they are represented to be.""' 2
Senate Bill 3744 died with the 74th Congress. Senator Wheeler
introduced Senate Bill 1077 in the 75th Congress. The version of
section 5 in Senate Bill 1077 contained the same first paragraph as
Senate Bill 3744. Endorsing Senate Bill 1077, the Commission
maintained that the
reason for the recommended amendment is that there are some
unfair or deceptive commercial practices which primarily injure
the public rather than competitors and in such cases it is difficult
to show the latter type of injury which the courts have held neces-
106. 1937 Hearings, supra note 100, reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 473-74.
107. 80 CONG. REC. 6436-6437 (1936), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 64 (empha-
sis supplied).
108. 80 CONG. REC. 6588 (1936), reprintedin C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 77.
109. S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1945), reprintedin C. DUNN, supra note 29, at
23.
110. 291 U.S. 304. See text accompanying note 73 supra. As late as June 1936, the Com-
mission reassured Congress that no ice-breaking was involved since "[als a matter of fact, the
words most frequently used by industry itself to define . ..unfair methods of competition
under the ... Act are 'unfair trade practices.'" C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 454.
111. FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935). The investigation started in 1928. The conclusions and recommendations in the
Commission's final report culminated in the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914. See C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 23, and the Robinson-Patman
Amendments to § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). Independent merchants striving
for governmental protection were the motivating force behind the chain store legislation as
well as the National Recovery Act codes. F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 8-11 (1962).
112. 80 CONG. REC. 6588 (1936), reprinedin C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 80-81 (emphasis
supplied).
sary under the present law.' 13
Ultimately, the Senate and House passed somewhat dissimilar ver-
sions of Senate Bill 1077.
Reporting the product of a conference, Senator Wheeler took
the opportunity to epitomize the purpose of amending section 5(a):
"This amendment makes the consumer who may be injured by an
unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with the
merchant injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competi-
tor.""' 4 Of course, this reference does not burden the prosecution
with proving dishonest purpose or character when the language of
the statute does not demand it." 5 The language strongly suggests
Senator Wheeler's opinion that section 5(a) is aimed at conduct so
unfair on its face or in effect that it indicates the presence of dishon-
est motives.
At a later date, in debate concerning acceptance of the confer-
ence report, Senator Wheeler opined, "By this bill the. . .Commis-
sion has jurisdiction where there is injury to the public."'" 6 Thus,
the concept of potential injury is impeached to some degree.
Nevertheless, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments became law in
1938.117
D. Judicial Aids to FTC Expansionism
Succeeding the Wheeler-Lea enactment, courts had little diffi-
culty acknowledging FTC assertions of jurisdiction without demon-
stration of anticompetitive effects. Probably due to the
Commission's internal organization, most of these acknowledge-
ments come in consumer protection cases."'
In Raladam II, " a deception case, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that "[olne of the objects of the [FTC] Act . ..was to
prevent potential injury by stopping unfair methods of competition in
their incipiency .. ."120 Despite this holding, it became fashiona-
ble, if not entirely sensible, to think of the Commission's jurisdiction
in two categories-unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices.
113. C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 123.
114. 83 CONG. REC. 4338 (1938), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 320 (emphasis
supplied).
115. But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
116. 83 CONG. REc. 4338 (1938), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 29, at 340 (emphasis
supplied).
117. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
118. Kahn v. F.T.C., 206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953); F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S.
142, 152 (1942) (sometimes referred to as Raladam 11); Wolf v. F.T.C., 135 F.2d 564, 567 (7th
Cir. 1943); Brewer & Sons v. F.T.C., 158 F.2d 74, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1946); Pep-Boys-Manny,
Moe & Jack v. F.T.C., 122 F.2d 158, 159-61 (3d Cir. 1941).
119. 316 U.S. 142.
120. Id at 152 (emphasis supplied).
1. Unfair Methods of Competition.-Unfair methods of com-
petition include restraints of trade addressed generally by the Sher-
man Act 21  and more particularly by the Clayton Act.12  The
Clayton Act explicitly provides enforcement roles for FTC,2 3 the
Sherman Act does not. Nonetheless, the array of Sherman Act sins
unmentioned by the Clayton Act are "unfair methods" within the
scope of section 5 of FTCA.2 4 Although technical limitations im-
plicit or explicit in antitrust statutes have not frustrated Commission
challenges to various species of conduct under section 5 of its en-
abling act, neither the Department of Justice, private suitors, nor
even FTC could have succeeded under statutes more particularly ad-
dressing the types of conduct in question.
Thus, when the acquisition strictures of section 7 of the Clayton
Act admitted of only corporate defendants, 2 5 the Commission ap-
plied the essence of section 7 to an unincorporated association.
2 6
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination in
sales of commodities2 7 but its principle has been applied to discrim-
inatory equipment rentals. 2 8 Section 2(f) of the Clayton Act bans
buyers' knowing. inducement or receipt of only price discrimina-
tions, 29 but section 5 of the Trade Commission Act has been used to
prohibit buyers' receipt of discriminatory merchandising al-
lowances. 30 Section 3 of the Clayton Act strikes at certain exclusive
dealing arrangements imposed by sellers or lessors of commodities
on buyers or lessees but not similar arrangements imposed by princi-
pals on agents or by buyers on sellers.' 3' Section 5 of the Trade
Commission Act fills the void.
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One decision supporting these exercises in analogy and curing
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976).
124. See, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S.457 (1941) (concerted refusals
to deal); F.T.C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927) (price-fixing).
125. Prior to 1980, § 7 of the Clayton Act provided that "no corporation" should engage
in acquisitions having anticompetitive effects. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1980 expanded the coverage of § 7 by including entities other than corporations,
ie., persons engaged "in any activity affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1981).
126. Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-66 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 17244.
127. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1976), does not address price discrimination in the sale of services, realty, or in-
tangibles. Many commercial activities are not covered by the statute.
128. LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
129. Although § 2 of the Clayton Act was directed primarily at sellers, Congress recog-
nized that the discriminatory seller was frequently a victim of excessive power possessed by a
buyer. Accordingly, § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Amendments, enacted as a corollary to
§ 2(a), imposes liability on buyers who knowingly induce or receive a price discrimination
prohibited by § 2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976).
130. American News Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824
(1962); Grand Union Co. v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
132. F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953); Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. F.T.C., 260 U.S. 568, 581 (1923).
presumed legislative oversight enunciated a bit of revisionism that
has become part of FTCA lore. In F T C. v. Motion Picture Advertis-
ing Service Co., 133 Justice Douglas explained that the FTCA was
"designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clay-
ton Act . . .to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which,
when full blown, would violate those Acts, .... ."134 This, of
course, was not the first acknowledgement of jurisdiction to address
the incipient' 35 but it serves to obscure that FTCA pre-dated the
Clayton Act.'
36
(a.) Antitrust of inciieny. -The antitrust of incipiency did not
emerge full blown until FTC v. Brown Shoe Co. (Brown Shoe
I1). 137 The essential facts were simple. More than 650 dealers par-
ticipated in the Brown Franchise Stores' Program but only 259 had
entered written franchise agreements which had liberal termination
provisions. This is against a background of approximately 70,000 to
100,000 shoe outlets, of which Brown owned 1,200. The program
contemplated Brown's provision of sales training, architectural
plans, data recordation systems, and discounted-rate group insur-
ance. In return, dealers were to refrain from purchasing other shoe
marketers' lines conflicting with lines of the Brown division promot-
ing the franchises.
An FTC examiner found that franchisees tended to buy sev-
enty-five percent of their shoes from Brown and analogized the ar-
rangement to exclusive dealing by which Brown's competitors were
foreclosed from a substantial number of retailers. Disagreeing with
the exclusive dealing concept, the Commission substituted its view
that the program was "akin to . . .tying clauses generally held as
inherently anticompetitive."' 138 In an unconscious tribute to Orwell,
the Commission held it unnecessary to examine the probable effect
on competition to characterize the program as unfair because the
"prospective competitive impact . . . is such that the standards of
illegality under ... . the Clayton Act . . .have been met." 139 The
Eighth Circuit reversed."4 Since no dominance over the tying prod-
ucts and services existed, the court of appeals could not discern any
comparability with Northern Pacfic14 1 or other classic tying deci-
133. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
134. Id at 394 (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., note 63 supra
136. The Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717-19 (1914) dates from Sep-
tember 26, 1914 whereas the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) dates from October 15,
1914.
137. F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1972).
138. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. F.T.C. 339 F.2d 45, 50 (8th Cir. 1964).
139. Id
140. Id at 53-54.
141. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 54 (1958).
sions. 4 2 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously held for the
Commission.'
43
Without mentioning tying, Justice Black stated the question as
whether the ... Commission can declare it to be an unfair prac-
tice for Brown, the second largest manufacturer of shoes in the
nation, to pay a valuable consideration to hundreds of. . .[shoe
retailers] . . . to secure a contractual promise . . .[to] ...deal
primarily with Brown and ...not purchase conflicting lines of
shoes. .... 144
The answer was that FTC "has power to find. . . such an anticom-
petitive practice unfair, subject of course to judicial review."' 4  For
future guidance, it was stated that the Commission has power to
condemn
trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actu-
ally violate these laws. . . .Our cases hold that the Commission
has power under section 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incpi-
ency without proof that they amount to. . . outright violation of
...the antitrust laws.146
Thus were presented certain anomalies. 47 If Clayton Act proscrip-
tions against certain requirements, tying, and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements 148 addressed incipient violations of the Sherman Act,
then the FTCA addresses incipient incipiencies.149 Although con-
demnation of requirements contracting, tying, or exclusive dealing
under section 3 of the Clayton Act demands a showing of reasonably
probable adverse effect on competition, 5 ° Brown Shoe II can be
read to teach that no such showing is requisite to an FTC order
against practices deemed likely to mature into tying or exclusive
dealing."'
In Brown Shoe II, the Court relied heavily on Justice Brandeis'
dissent 2 in F T C. v. Gratz, 13 particularly his recognition of a legis-
lative intent "to prevent any unfair method. . . used by any concern
...from becoming its general practice. . .[since]. . .only by [so]
stopping its use. . [could]. . .the apprehended effect of an unfair
142. 339 F.2d at 54-55.
143. 394 U.S. 316 (1966).
144. Id at 320.
145. Id
146. Id at 321-22 (emphasis supplied by the court) (citations omitted).
147. The anomalies, however, later paled into insignificance. See text accompanying
notes 156-96 infra.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1973).
149. Maher, Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local, 80 DICK. L. REV. 193, 211 (1976),
reprinted in I CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL 541, 561 (H. Friedman, J. O'Brien & H.
Schlagman ed. 1977).
150. See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
151. See text accompanying notes 139-49 supra.
152. 384 U.S. at 320.
153. 253 U.S. 421, 429 (1920). See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
method in suppressing competition. . . be averted."' 54 Whether the
Brown Shoe HI Court understood Brandeis remains in question since
one of the effects of Brown Shoe II was to substantially relieve the
Commission from showing "the apprehended effect" that is to be
averted.155
2. Unfair Acts or Practices.- Language in FTC. v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. (S & H), 156 decided by the Supreme Court in 1972,
at least suggests that FTC's judicial role is triggered by "public val-
ues beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws."' 157 Indulging such rhetoric, the Court
may have oriented commission personnel to the potential for using
the "unfair. . .acts or practices" jurisdiction in contexts other than
those of demonstrable need for consumer protection. The Court's
method of illustrating its use of "public values" was termed by the
December 1981 Commissioners as "the three S & H criteria" or
"standards."'
S & H, of course, is a famed trading-stamp company. Its mar-
keting program contemplated that retailers would purchase use of
stamps, delivered by them to their customers as a premium for pa-
tronage. S & H purported to retain ownership of the stamps. Steps
were taken to inform retailers and their customers that the sole
proper uses of the stamps were collection and presentation for S &
H's redemption through authorized channels. The obvious purpose
was to minimize commercial trading in the company's stamps, lest
such traffic reduce their attractiveness to retailer-customers. A less
obvious purpose may have been to minimize incentives for higher
rates of redemption than were normal for the average consumer who
received issuers' stamps and was not inclined to devote great energy
to trading unwanted stamps for those of a favorite issuer. S & H
tolerated non-profit exchanges by ordinary consumers but commer-
cial trading in its property was arrested through injunctions against
unauthorized uses and threats to seek relief.
Undeterred by an examiner's dismissal of charges under section
5 of FTCA, the Commission found an "impairment of competi-
tion."' 5 9 S & H was ordered inter alia to stop interfering with stamp
dealing. Central to the Commission's action was a holding that S &
H's practice "prevents... competitive reaction(s) and thereby it has
154. 253 U.S. at 441-42.
155. 253 U.S. at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Maher, Two Little Words andFTC
Goes Local, 80 DICK. L. REV. 193 (1976), reprinted in 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL 541
(H. Friedman, J. O'Brien & H. Schlagman ed. 1977).
156. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
157. Id at 244 (footnotes omitted).
158. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra and text accompanying notes 250-84 infra.
159. 405 U.S. at 247.
restrained trade . . ., [which is] . . . an unfair method of competi-
tion and an unfair act or practice in violation of section 5 of the...
Act."' 60
The Fifth Circuit vacated those portions of the order precluding
interference with trading in S & H stamps. Unable to discern any
violations of antitrust policy, the Court asserted,
To be the type of practice that . .. [is] . . . 'unfair' . [it must
be]: (1) a per se violation of antitrust policy; (2) a violation of the
letter of either the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts;
(3) a violation of the spirit of these Acts as recognized by the
Supreme Court .... Congress could not have intended to vest
the Commission with such broad discretion as to allow it to label a
restraint 'unfair' without applying some judicial guidelines. 6 '
From this Judge Wisdom dissented because the majority failed "to
give effect to the broad authority Congress granted to" FTC and
therefore "blesse[d] unfair anticompetitive practices .... ," 62 Pre-
sumably, the otherwise superfluous use of "unfair" was for emphasis.
An issue proposed by the Government petition for certiorari
was "[wihether section 5... is limited to conduct which violates the
letter or spirit of the antitrust laws."'
163
The Supreme Court recognized that the Commission's opinion
explaining predicates for the challenged order could not be read "as
premised on anything other than the classic antitrust rationale of re-
straint of trade and injury to competition"'" whereas the Govern-
ment's effort to reverse the Fifth Circuit proceeded on the theory that
antitrust statutes do not limit Commission power to address unfair
practices.' 65 Despite this obvious contradiction, the Court re-
sponded negatively to the issue. 66 The state of the record, however,
was deemed to require ultimate remand to the Commission. 67 The
Court noted that the Commission's opinion was "barren of any at-
tempt to rest the order on . . . assessment of particular competitive
practices or considerations of consumer interests independent of pos-
sible or actual effects on competition."'' 61 Immediately succeeding
this was a suggestion that standards for such assessment must be "re-
ferred to or developed."'
' 69
In S & H, the Commission lost a battle but won a war. The
Court provided an interesting version of the developing Trade Com-
160. Id.
161. 432 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 151-56.
163. 405 U.S. at 239.
164. Id. at 246.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 245.
167. Id. at 250.
168. Id. at 248.
169. Id.
mission jurisprudence 7" including, curiously, an extract from the
Wheeler-Lea history that focused on protection against "dishonest
competitors."' 7 1 This history recited, the Court then observed,
[L]egislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
. . . Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally man-
dated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considerspub-
lic values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or
encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
172
Perhaps incompability between Commission action and later ar-
guments on its behalf should have led to recognition that certiorari
was granted improvidently. The Court, however, chose another
route. Having accepted the Government's argument but unable sim-
ply to reverse the Fifth Circuit because of inconsistencies between
the Commission's fact-findings and conclusions as well as between
those conclusions and its appellate position, the Court modified the
Fifth Circuit's judgment to direct remand to the Commission for fur-
ther proceedings.' 73 Thus, the Commission's failure to sustain the
grounds upon which it had acted was rewarded with the opportunity
to try a different theory. Despite a long tradition to the contrary, the
Court provided an advisory opinion in which it called upon the
Commission to refer to "public values" as it developed and explicat-
ed standards for assessing practices alleged to be unfair albeit neither
deceptive nor clearly anticompetitive.17
4
Within the opinion, the Court used a lengthy footnote to illus-
trate the reference to "public values."' 75 The footnote presented a
truncated extract from a fifty-page Statement of Basis and Pur-
pose176 for a cigarette labeling trade regulation.' 77 It is upon this
footnote that those who purport to recognize the existence of "S & H
standards," as well as those who purport to be able to dispense with
such a standard, must rely. Because of its nature and subsequent
uses, 78 the footnote demands reproduction in its entirety:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in deter-
mining whether a practice which is neither in violation of the anti-
trust laws nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been pre-
viously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whatever,
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some com-
170. Id. at 239-44.
171. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
172. Id. (emphasis supplied).
173. Id. at 245-50.
174. Id. at 248.
175. 405 U.S. at 244-45. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
176. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325-75 (1964).
177. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
178. See text accompanying notes 243-63 and 276-87 infra.
mon-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competi-
tors or other businessmen). 'Statement of Basis and Purpose of
Trade Regulation Rule 408 [Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking].' 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964).
S&H argues that a later portion of this statement commits the
FTC to the view that misconduct in respect of the third of these
criteria is not subject to constraint as "unfair" absent a concomi-
tant showing of misconduct according to the first or second of
these criteria. But all the FTC said in the statement referred to
was that 'The wide variety of decisions interpreting the elusive con-
cept of unfairness at least makes clear that a method of selling
violates Section 5 if it is exploitative or inequitable and if, in addi-
tion to being morally objectionable, it is seriously detrimental to
consumers or others.",
79
Note the transition from "factors" cited as a predicate for rulemak-
ing to later language in the Statement of Basis as one of respondent's
arguments is addressed. Unfortunately omitted from the Commis-
sion's 1964 prose is a sentence linking the factors to the commentary
on a "wide variety of decisions": "I/ all threefactors are present, the
challenged conduct will surely violate section 5 even if there is no
specific precedent for proscribing it."'"8 Also elided is Commission
recognition that, beyond hallmarks provided by exploitation or ineq-
uity compounded by moral objectionability and serious detriment to
consumers, "it is difficult to generalize."' 8 '
All of this appeared in a short section of the Statement of Basis
captioned "Unfair Acts or Practices." The section was introduced by
a misconstruction of Keppel, ignoring that it addressed anticompeti-
tive conduct 18 2 and misrepresenting dicta as "the principle of Kep-
pel ",183 A list of practices assertedly recognized as "unfair" was
presented; however, the list mixes deceptive practices with rather di-
rect anticompetitive conduct. Those unburdened by deception or
immediate anticompetitiveness are distinguished by bribery and
other species of inducement to conflict of interest, coercion, trespass,
and violation of then clear public policy concerning lotteries or easy
analogies to these concepts.1
8 4
This catalog of sins was said to "suggest" the three factors "that
determine whether a particular act or practice should be forbidden
179. 405 U.S. at 244-45 n.5 (emphasis added). Inclusion of "oppressive" in the second
factor is particularly noteworthy in context of the Commission's 1937 disclaimer of intent or
need to address the oppressive. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
180. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964) (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
183. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354 (1964).
184. Id.
on" the ground of unfairness." 5 One of the illustrative cases may
have been cited fairly. 86 In any event, the Court purported in 1971
to recognize part of a Commission rendition of 1964 legislative intent
asfactors considered by the Commission in a litigation context when
it must determine whether an act or practice should be characterized
as unfair. However egregious the Court's error, it seems inescapably
clear that reference to the 1964 self-serving declaration was intended
to be nothing other than illustrative.
Although the Court's scholarship was questionable, one cannot
escape its disposition of the S&H case and its implicit call for the
Commission to develop and apply standards for recognizing the de-
monstrably unfair in the absence of deceptive or anticompetitive im-
pact. 8 7 The Commission had not applied the cigarette-labeling
factors in the S&H case. Rather, as the Court observed, 88 "the con-
siderations urged" before it "in support of the Commission's order
were not those upon which its action was based."'8 9 Thus, the
Court's reference to "public values" 9° was merely a potentially val-
uable aside and the footnote was of even less significance.
Consequently, there should be little need to consider the dubi-
ous proposition that the three factors were suggested by judicial and
quasi-judicial precedent. Surely the 1971 Court provided no index
that it examined whether the precedents cited by FTC truly sug-
gested' 9 1 -let alone mandated--the three factors. To the degree a
need exists to consider the 1964 statement of legislative purpose,
other words of the Commission deserve attention. Immediately suc-
ceeding the Commission's listing of the factors and its recognition of
difficulty implicit in generalization was a recognition that, while
"[sjection 5 does not authorize regulation which has no purpose
other than censoring the morals of businessmen . . . the Commis-
sion cannot shirk the difficult task of defining and preventing those
breaches of the principles of fair dealing that cause substantial and
unjustifiable public injury."'
192
What is the S&H legacy in terms of law? Very minimal, except
for a strong hint that FTC develop and apply standards for deter-
mining "whether the challenged practices, though posing no threat
to competition within the precepts of the antitrust laws, are neverthe-
less either (1) unfair methods of competition or (2) unfair or decep-
185. Id.
186. Id. at 8355.
187. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
188. 405 U.S. at 248.
189. Id. at 249.
190. Id. citing S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943).
191. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
192. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964) (citations omitted).
tive acts or practices."' 19 3 This reasonably demonstrates that "unfair
methods" may not immediately threaten the competitive process. It
also equates such methods with unfair practices. Unfortunately, the
potency for the essentially unfair to be characterized through uses of
the Commission's penumbral benchmarks leave compliance counsel-
ors with greater problems than they possessed before President Wil-
son's endorsement of a Trade Commission.
94
What is within the "penumbra of some common-law, statutory
or other established concept of unfairness?"' 95 Keppel pointed to
conduct accorded "condemnation throughout the community" and
conduct "of the sort ...common law and statutes have deemed
contrary to public policy."' 96 S&H did not deal with such conduct.
Despite the S&H Court's non-pioneering equation of the Commis-
sion with equity courts, these courts had given credence to the S&H
conduct attacked by the Commission. Lest one say too quickly that
only the Commission could have attacked the pattern, wouldn't
S&H's resort to a court for equitable relief have provided a forum
for consideration of the cleanliness of S&H's hands?
Before S&H, the Commission dealt successfully with questiona-
ble promotions aimed at consumers or competitors. Targets in-
cluded trading on the gambling instinct,' 97 false disparagement of
competitors' products, 98 inducing breach of contracts with competi-
tors, 199 advertising claims exceeding product capacity, 2" and ficti-
tious pricing.2° ' Immediately succeeding S&H, the Commission
193. 405 U.S. at 245.
194. For example, the United States is a member of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Convention for the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, Dec. 3, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728. In June 1976, the OECD pub-
lished its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as part of a Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Declaration on International Investment and Mul-
tinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Annexed to the
Declaration, reprinted in R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 133-44 (19.77). See, e.g., Maher, Supranational Regimes for
Multinationals: The New Order With a New Face?, 4 DEL. J. OF CORP. LAW 289 (1979),
reprinted in 2 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL 1277, 1299 (E. BurchelU & J. Spires ed. 1980).
The Guidelines strike inter alia at intra-enterprise transfer pricing to the degree it is used "as a
means of affecting competition outside these enterprises."
The Declaration purports to state the national policies of member states, including the
United States. Are the Guidelines so a part of national policy as to come within the first of the
"factors" and, thus lend color to attacks on intra-enterprise prices lower than prices afforded in
arms-length market transactions? This illustration is not offered as a suggestion that, if the
OECD guides are within the penumbra of FTC competency, the focus on intra-enterprise
pricing is the Guidelines' only feature that is strange to the American context.
195. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
196. 291 U.S. at 313.
197. Gellman v. F.T.C., 290 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1961); Wren Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 296 F.2d
456 (7th Cir. 1961).
198. E.B. Mueller & Co. v. F.T.C., 132 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
199. Carter Carburetor Co. v. F.T.C., 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
200. Western Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
938 (1965).
201. F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
took the position that a marketer's failure to possess a data base pro-
viding reasonable basis for affirmative product claims is itself an un-
fair practice.
2 2
Beneficiaries of the Commission's traditional vigilance concern-
ing unfair or deceptive acts or practices include "the unthinking and
credulous . . . as well as the more sophisticated and intelligent. 20 3
Tendency or capacity to mislead will suffice 20 4 in consumer decep-
tion cases and absence of intent to mislead is not a defense.20 5 Pro-
ceeding by analogy either to statutes other than those enforced by
FTC or to a presumed legislative policy is not peculiar to FTC
antitrust.
2°6
In re Itizer207 is the first case in which the Commission appar-
ently attempted to meet the S&H challenge to develop and explicate
standards. Pfizer had merchandised an ointment with glowing
claims concerning its ability to relieve pain associated with sunburn.
The Commission did not charge deception. Rather, it charged that it
was an unfair practice to make such claims, even if true, without hav-
ing conducted tests scientifically sufficient to validate the claims.
The Commission enunciated a line of thought worthy of the
early California leadership to strict liability in tort:2 8 "Given the
imbalance of knowledge and resources between a business. . . and
its customers . . .[t]he consumer is entitled, as a matter of market-
place fairness, to rely upon the manufacturer to have a 'reasonable
basis' for making performance claims. '"209 This reasoning was enun-
ciated despite recognition that either anticipated margins or extreme
complexity of a product might make the cost of such data accumula-
tion efforts prohibitively onerous. The Commission failed to explain
its source of power to indulge in risk allocation. Instead, it exulted
that "[u]nfairness is potentially a dynamic analytical tool capable of
a progressive, evolving application which can keep pace with a rap-
idly changing economy. ' 210 This was but the beginning.
In Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 2 11 the Seventh Circuit treated the fac-
tors alluded to in S&H as though approved by the Supreme
202. In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
203. A.P.W. Paper Co. v. F.T.C., 149 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1945), afl'd, 328 U.S. 193
(1946).
204. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Co. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1944).
205. Feil v. F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960).
206. See, e.g., Lamrite West, Inc., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,000 (flammable wooden leis attacked by analogy to Flammable Fabrics Act); Ford Motor
Co. v. F.T.C., 657 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981) § 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
207. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
208. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
209. 81 F.T.C. at 61 (citation omitted).
210. Id at 61.
211. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
Court.
2 12 Other courts have given considerable deference to the fac-
tors.213 Thus, it appears that poor advocates or unthinking courts, or
both, are abetting efforts to have the factors achieve status as the
"S&H standards" or the "S&H criteria." The former is the more
objectionable in light of the Supreme Court's urging that the Com-
mission develop and explain standards for applying the unfairness
proscription.214
E Magnuson-Aoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1975
The Commission was strengthened by the Magnuson-Moss
Act.2" 5 Aside from the newly assigned explicit role in connection
with warranty games, 216 leading elements included the following:
the Commission's general jurisdiction over unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce was
expanded to cover conduct affecting commerce; 217 specialized food,
drug, and cosmetic advertising jurisdiction was broadened simi-
larly;218 traditional powers to investigate and exact reports from cor-
porations engaged in commerce were enlarged to embrace 'persons,
partnerships, or corporations, engaged in and whose business affects
commerce" excepting certain regulated industries;219 and, the Com-
mission was given explicit power to promulgate substantive trade
regulation rules subject to specified procedural steps.22°
The Commission was given power to sue for a civil penalty up
to $10,000 per day for each knowing violation of either a trade regu-
lation rule or an order to cease and desist. 22' The Act also included
a feature competent to abridge the procedural niceties supposedly
attendant on rulemaking.222 Section 5(m)(1)(B) provided that per-
sons not parties to proceedings giving rise to cease and desist orders
are susceptible to awesome penalties for committing acts defined as
unfair or deceptive in such orders.223
212. Id at 293 n.8.
213. National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1220 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
214. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
215. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-11 (1980).
217. See note 13 supra.
218. 223 U.S.C. § 54 (1976).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1976).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1976).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976).
222. Section 5(m)(I)(B) further necessitated a careful address to the facts of succeeding
cases presumably expected of an agency likened to a court sitting in equity.
223. The statute provides,
If the Commission determines in a proceeding under subsection (b) of this section
that any act or practice is unfair or deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order
Presumably, visitation of actual knowledge upon entire classes
of potential respondents would not be too difficult for an agency pos-
sessed of appropriate mailing lists and the franking privilege. The
potencies implicit in the power to bind non-parties to characteriza-
tions arrived at in litigation beyond the non-parties' capacity to con-
trol should quiet analogies to courts sitting in equity and quite
possibly trigger fifth amendment values. Certainly notions of fair
play do not permit co-existence of the interpretation of S&H appar-
ently indulged by the Commissioners of December 1980 and the /i-
zer exultation224 with section 5(m)(1)(B). Perhaps the result is no
worse than that achieved through rulemaking. The minimal safe-
guards associated with rulemaking, however, are qualitatively better
than those implicit in certified mail advices of others' failures to per-
suade the programmatic "equity court."
F Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980
The 1980 amendments are "improvements" different than those
enacted in 1975. In 1975 the Commission was strengthened. In
1980225 it underwent some wing-clipping but its powers were not
minimized in a real sense.
Passage of the 1980 act was definitely related to the Commis-
sion's impolitic choice of a rulemaking target. There is an old bro-
mide that corporations don't vote. For that reason, basic political
wisdom suggests it is easier to attack General Motors than it is to
take on a welfare lobby or the American Legion. The Commission
had undertaken fashioning a trade regulation rule concerning the fu-
neral industry226 and ultimately discovered not only that funeral di-
rectors vote but that they are numerous and likely to be community
activists worthy of a legislator's ear. The collective anger of under-
takers, believing themselves under assault, was quickly utilized by
other interest groups not so likely to generate mass support.
2 2 7
with respect to such act or practice, then the Commission may commence a civil
action to obtain a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any
person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act or practice, (1) after
such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not such person, partnership,
or corporation was subject to such cease and desist order), and (2) with actual knowl-
edge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under subsection
(a)(1) of this section. In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be
liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (Supp. 1981).
224. See text accompanying note 210 supra.
225. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (1980).
226. 30 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (1975).
227. Former Chairman Pertschuk observed that a society of "victims of the FTC" en-
gulfed Congress as onslaughts were made on the propriety of a long-term inquiry into adver-
tising oriented to children; efforts to regulate door-to-door salespersons; mandating disclosures
appropriate to used car marketing; rulemaking concerning voluntary standardization systems;
a model state insurance cost disclosure law; an antimonopoly case against the Sunkist agricul-
The end product was a statute that channeled future progress of
the funeral industry trade regulation rule;228 limited future progress
of rulemaking concerning advertising oriented to children; 229 limited
ability to investigate aspects of the insurance industry;230 strength-
ened protection to be afforded respondents' trade secrets; 23' limited
the Commission's Lanham Trademark Act 232 authority to seek can-
cellation of registered trademarks; 233 provided improved leverage for
parties to cease and desist orders to seek modification or vacation of
such orders;234 and, perhaps most significantly in terms of the Com-
mission's ability to coerce, provided that use of section 6 powers235 to
investigate unfair or deceptive acts or practices under section 5(a)(1)
is to be governed by various requirements appropriate to civil inves-
tigative demands. 236 The last is important since each demand is sub-
ject to numerous requirements including a duty to "state the nature
of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under in-
vestigation and the provision of the law applicable to such
violation. "237
Great controversy surrounded section 21 of the 1980 Act. It
provides that FTC must submit a final rule to Congress while it is in
session and Congress can void the rule by concurrent resolution
within "90 calendar days of continuous session. 238 Much of the
controversy dealt with undercutting responsible administrators,
politicizing the rulemaking process, and similar Platonic an-
tidemocratic arguments. Serious concern was expressed because the
President is excluded from the ninety-day game.2 39 If the Commis-
sion can be empowered as a legislative sub-delegate without expo-
sure to Presidential veto, there can be little objection to the people's
primary legislative delegate retaining a veto over its subdelegate.
tural cooperative; and efforts to restrain private over-regulation of the professions. M. Pert-
schuk, Lecture at University of California SchQol of Business Administration (Berkeley
Campus), Lecture III of series captioned The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement:
Political Strategies of Regulation and Deregulation (Nov. 9, 1981) (available in office of the
Dickinson Law Review).
228. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 18, 84
Stat. 374, 391-92 (1980).
229. Id § 11, at 378-79.
230. Id § 5, at 375-76.
231. Id § 4, at 374, 375.
232. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
233. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 18, 84
Stat. 374, 391 (1980).
234. Id § 2, at 374.
235. Id § 6, at 376.
236. Id § 20, at 380.
237. Id § 20(c)(2), at 381.
238. Id § 21(a)(2), at 393. See also 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a)(l) (1980).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1 (1980).
G. The Letter
On December 17, 1980,240 the Commissioners acknowledged a
June 1980 advice that, in connection with possible oversight hearings
on "unfairness" as applied to consumer transactions, the Consumer
Subcommittee for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation solicited Commission views on applications of
section 5 "not involving the content of advertising" as well as on
"whether the Commission's authority should be limited to regulating
'false or deceptive' commercial advertising."24'
Admitting that "consumer unfairness" lacks an "immediately
obvious" meaning and "that this uncertainty has been honestly
troublesome for some businesses and. . . members of the legal pro-
fession," '242 the Commissioners agreed that "[t]his result is under-
standable in light of the general nature of the statutory
standards." '243 Having committed this recognition to a record of
sorts, the Commissioners undertook to respond to "legitimate con-
cerns . . . by attempting to delineate . . a concrete framework for
future application of the . . . unfairness authority."'" Professing
confidence that "cumulative decisions . . . have brought clarity to
the law" but cautioning that "evolution of the consumer unfairness
concept has still left some necessary flexibility," the Commissioners
wrote that "it is possible to provide a reasonable working sense of
the conduct that is covered. 245
Unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices
were explicitly put aside. The Commissioners offered Brown Shoe
I/246 as a non-exclusive exemplar of its antitrust ambit.247 A history
of sorts was offered but its treatment of pre-S&H history was
summary.248
The burden of the Commissioners' presentation to the Con-
sumer Subcommittee is borne by the factors described in the 1964
Statement of Basis and Purpose249 concerning cigarette advertis-
ing.250 After reporting Supreme Court quotation of the criteria
"with apparent approval" in S&H,25' the Commissioners mysteri-
ously shifted to "the three S&H criteria.'"252 Prior to this, the Com-
240. See note 6 supra.
241. Letter, supra note 6, at 1.
242. Id
243. Id at 1-2.
244. Id at 2.
245. Id
246. See text accompanying notes 137-154 supra.
247. Letter, supra note 6, at 3 n.4.
248. Id at 3-5.
249. See text accompanying notes 176-184 supra.
250. Letter, supra note 6, at 4 n.8.
251. Id at 5.
252. Id
* missioners very tightly paraphrased the cigarette advertising criteria
as follows: "(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether
it violates established public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or un-
scrupulous. 253 Why the criteria were reordered is not clear. Nor is
it immediately obvious why "established" was retained while "im-
moral" and "oppressive" were dropped from the house-formulation.
Presumably out of deference to the Supreme Court's exhortation to
develop standards and explain their application, the Commissioners
claimed that the Commission had continued to refine the "standard
of unfairness" and had achieved a "more detailed sense of both the
definition and. . . limits of these criteria.
254
Communicating that good news, the Commissioners proceeded
to remark "[u]njustified consumer injury," described as "the most
important of the three S&H criteria" and as "the primary focus of
the FTC Act." '255 Neither the word "unjustified" nor the concept of
"unjustified injury" appears in the cigarette advertising Statement of
Basis itself, in the Supreme Court's illustrative abstract,256 or in the
Commission's tight paraphrase. 7 Assuming the innocence of this
revisionism, one might discern a suggestion that there are justified
consumer injuries and infer that the allusion is to a cost-benefit anal-
ysis similar to that offered in the Pfizer decision.258 The "unjustified
consumer injury" factor was described as sufficient "[bly itself...
to warrant a finding of unfairness. '25 9 Curiously, this was buttressed
by allusion to Senator Wheeler's epitomization of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments' purpose as being to make consumers of equal concern
with merchants injured by the methods of "a dishonest competi-
tor."'260 This encapsulation has little to do with either cost-benefit
analyses or characterizing injuries as justified or unjustified.
Lest one be led to think that the Commissioners completely ig-
nored the quality of unfairness when describing "the most important
of the three S&H criteria," consider "three tests" of consumer injury,
which must be satisfied to "justify a finding of unfairness": "It must
be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing ben-
efits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it
must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably
have avoided."'26 ' Not one of these elements individually focuses on
253. Id at 4.
254. Letter, supra note 6, at 5. Conceivably, someone had discovered the Wheeler-Lea
legislative history's rejection of oppression as a subject of FTC address. See text accompany-
ing note 100 supra.
255. Id
256. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
257. See text accompanying note 253 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 207-210 supra.
259. Letter, supra note 6, at 5.
260. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
261. Letter, supra note 6, at 5. See text accompanying note 116 supra. In 1982, the Com-
a potential respondent's conduct. Also, none have an obvious rela-
tionship to traditional concepts of constructive or equitable fraud.
Ignoring considerations of a marketer's intent, these concepts prima-
rily focus on a buyer's reliance on an incorrect but material state of
facts for the existence of which a marketer can be said to be responsi-
ble in whole or in substantial part.
Taken together, the "three tests" for "unjustified consumer in-
jury" have much in common with a cost-benefit theory enunciated in
a 1975 Initial Notice of Credit Practice rulemaking262 and the very
assumptions upon which NIRA was founded.263 They look to iden-
tifying market practices that consumers find difficult to elude, which
arguably flow from disproportionate bargaining power, and for
which Commission personalities think they can devise a less onerous
substitute. This is not the milieu in which courts of equity operate.
It is the stuff of social reform. The Commissioners of 1980 admitted
as much.2" Illustrating the cost-benefit "test", they referred to ap-
propriate considerations in promulgating a rule concerning preserva-
tion of consumers' claims and defenses.
265
[Wlhen the Commision promulgated the Holder Rule it antici-
pated an overall lowering of economic costs to society because the
rule gave creditors the incentive to police sellers, thus increasing
the likelihood that those selling defective goods or services would
either improve their practices or leave the marketplace when they
could not obtain financing. These benefits, in the Commission's
judgment, outweighed any costs to creditors and sellers occa-
sioned by the rule.266
Thus, to drive unscrupulous marketers from one marketplace, the
Commission regulated another market. With or without this sophis-
tication, the Commissioners in December 1980 ranked the Holder
Rule with the NRA Codes of Fair Conduct, which Congress was
held unable to authorize.267
Ultimately, some focus on marketer conduct was suggested.
Addressing consumers' inability to avoid injury, the Commission re-
ferred to the following market-distorting techniques: withholding or
failing to generate "critical price or performance data" including
"leaving buyers with insufficient information for informed compari-
sons"; coercion; and, wonder of wonders, deception.26 While indul-
mission, chaired by a Reagan appointee, indicated some sympathy with the second test. F.T.C.
letter of March 5, 1982 to Senators Bob Packwood and Bob Kasten in their capacities as rank-
ing members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 42 ATTR
(BNA) 568,570 (Mar. 11, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Letter].
262. 40. 53,506 (1975).
263. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
264. Letter, st.pra note 6, at 6.
265. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506 & 53, 522-23 (1975).
266. Letter, supra note 6, at 7 n.18.
267. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506 & 53,523 (1975).
268. Letter, supra note 6, at 8.
gence in these "techniques" may hinder development of a
completely efficient marketplace, the Commissioners made no obvi-
ous effort to explain a need to focus on marketer conduct and injury
to consumers. Contrary to much of the history of FTCA,26 9 the im-
plication is that substantial injury alone will establish unfairness of
the act or practice causing the injury. In the unlikely event the Com-
missioners intended to create such an impression, it is at least
equally unlikely to be accepted by the current Supreme Court.
270
Even innocent creation of such an impression could well be charac-
terized as misleading unless the Commissioners have a substantial
data base extraneous to consent decrees and their own statements of
purpose.
Violation of public policy was styled as the "second S&H stan-
dard."27' This standard was susceptible of two differing applica-
tions. One is to test "validity and strength of the evidence of
consumer injury. ' 27 2 The other differs qualitatively. The criterion
"may be cited for a dispositive legislative or judicial determination
that such injury is present." '273 Of these, only the latter appears use-
ful in characterizing a respondent's conduct but it says too much.
The role of dispositive extra-Commission statutes or precedent is
certainly not limited to providing grist for citation mills geared to
announcing that injury speaks for itself.
Addressing the first application, the Commissioners criticized
the Supreme Court's use of the cigarette advertising factors: "Al-
though public policy was listed by the S&H Court as a separate con-
sideration, it is used most frequently by the Commission as a means
of providing additional evidence on the degree of consumer injury
caused by specific practices .... ,,274 This is in context of a protesta-
tion that "most Commission actions" address "relatively clear-cut in-
juries, and those determinations are based, in large part, on objective
economic analysis. ' 275 Economic analysis of the "clear-cut" is req-
uisite because of a belief that "considerable attention should be de-
voted to. .. analysis of whether substantial net harm has occurred,
not only because that is part of the unfairness test," but also because
it is necessary to prudent husbanding of Commission resources.276
Thus, cost-benefit analysis is emphasized on two levels-identifying
269. See text accompanying note 81 supra. The one market distorting technique probably
excluded includes failure to facilitate comparison shipping.
270. See text accompanying notes 38-43, 59-78, 92-118 supra.
271. Letter, supra note 6, at 9.
272. Id
273. Id
274. Letter, supra note 6, at 9.
275. Id
276. Id
consumer injury and resource management. Obviously, neither re-
lates to marketer conduct and the latter is unobjectionable.
The Commissioners cited Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council27 7 for the proposition that
"outside statutory policies and established judicial principles" assist
in ascertaining "whether a particular form of conduct does in fact
tend to harm consumers. 2 7 The citation clearly flows from a con-
viction that injury always characterizes conduct.
Happily, the Commissioners ultimately recognized sometime
utility of well-established public policy as independent support for
Commission action. Even in doing so, they indulged a misleading
retreat to concentration on injury and opined that independent sup-
port was present
when the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the ques-
tion of consumer injury, so there is little need for separate analysis
by the Commission. In these cases the legislature or court, in an-
nouncing the policy, has already determined that such injury does
exist and thus it need not be expressly proved in each instance.
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This generalization is not only obviously incorrect, it also fails to
serve the Commission's mission. What is wrong with reference to
"established" policy that characterizes a species of conduct as antiso-
cial but leaves determination of injury to fact finders? Prosecutors
obsessed with a need to collect pelts would naturally be happier if
relieved in all cases not only from the burden of showing injury but
also of proving that it is caused by conduct easily characterized as
antisocial. But prosecutors' aspirations are not always substitutable
for burdens of proof. Section 5 continues to address not only meth-
ods, practices, and acts that are themselves unfair but also conduct
that should be addressed in the public interest.
Declaring that "the third S&H standard asks whether the con-
duct was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous," the
Commissioners astoundingly observed that "this test was presuma-
bly included in order to be sure of reaching all the purposes of the
underlying statute, which forbids 'unfair' acts or practices."28 0
Use of "presumably" could easily be styled presumptuous.
Who first published the "standard"? The author is the Trade Com-
mission circa 1964 and not the Supreme Court circa 1972. The
Commissioners of December 1980 were not speaking as historians.
Collectively, they are the keepers of the Commission's memory. One
of them, a particularly distinguished and honorable man, was a
277. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
278. Letter, supra note 6, at 9.
279. Id at 10.
280. Id at 12.
Commissioner in 1964.281 Their access to what was meant is pre-
sumably superior but at least equal to that enjoyed by ordinary folk
who can consult the Federal Register.
Having implied personal innocence regarding why the "third
S&H standard" was included, the incumbent Commissioners opined
that it would allow the Commission to reach conduct. that violates
"generally recognized standards of business ethics," which "test has
proven, however, to be largely duplicative."282 Duplicative of what?
Conduct that is truly unethical or unscrupulous will almost always
injure consumers or violate public policy as well. The Commis-
sion has therefore never relied on the the third element of S&H as
an independent basis for a finding of unfairness, and it will act in
the future only on the basis of the first two.28 3
Thus stands the "suggestion" explicitly acknowledged in the ciga-
rette advertising Statement of Basis.284
In 1972, the Supreme Court elided the conjunctive nature of the
three factors that the 1964 Commission considered suggested by pre-
cedent. In 1980, the Commissioners dispensed with one of the fac-
tors in favor of disjunctively stated injury-oriented revisions of the
remaining "criteria." Yet, as used by the 1980 Commission, only the
dispensable factor would characterize respondent's conduct!
H Effect of the Commissioners' Letter
If the S&H reference to the "factors" 285 was merely illustrative
of the reference to "public values," 28 6 the Commissioners' December
1980 epistle287 to the Senators achieved nothing except possibly di-
recting senatorial attention and the unwary away from the source of
the factors.2 8
If the S&H reference to the factors was definitive, it was defini-
tive only of "public values" and is not exhaustive of the unfairness
concept. If it was definitive, it must be taken on its own terms and is
not subject to revision by Commissioners of the moment. If the con-
junctive nature of the factors is law, the Commission cannot change
it. While Justice White omitted the conjunctive use of the factors in
quoting from the cigarette advertising Statement of Basis, he did not
insist that they be cast in the disjunctive as he called upon the Com-
mission to develop standards of decision and explain their applica-
281. The Honorable Paul Rand Dixon was a Commissioner in 1964.
282. Letter, supra note 6, at 12.
283. Id (emphasis supplied).
284. See text accompanying notes 178-186 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 179-181 supra.
286. See text accompanying notes 172-179 supra.
287. See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
288. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
tion. Recaptioning the criteria to imply Supreme Court authorship
does not constitute development of standards.
If the S&H reference to the factors was not only definitive but
also in the disjunctive, the Commissioners of a time cannot be faith-
ful to their quasi-judicial role and abandon one of the tests although,
most assuredly, the prosecutorial function could decide against reli-
ance on one or more of the factors.
Other than propagandistic attribution of the factors to the
Supreme Court, the principal accomplishment of the Commission-
ers' letter is to establish that there is nothing concrete about the un-
fair acts or practice language absent presence of deception, coercion,
or other conduct clearly affecting the integrity of the marketplace.
To be sure, if the Commissioners' thesis is accepted, injury-oriented
tests would avoid the difficulties attendant on analyses of conduct
and linking conduct to injury. Real or imagined injury does not es-
tablish the unfair nature of conduct causing or said to cause it. In-
jury should not excuse the defender of the marketplace from
showing the nature of conduct causing harm.
The Commissioners have established that the FTCA provision
addressing unfair acts or practice is so vague that it resists the pre-
dictability of prosecution hopefully implicit in a counselor's ability
to analyze clients' proposals and, as interpreted by recent Commis-
sioners, is so formless that it permits regulatory initiatives offensive
to the holding of the "Chicken Case." '289
Amendment of the Act is requisite if one accepts the need for an
agency such as Wilson envisioned.290 Legislation should not focus
on enforcing business ethics, any version of morality, or other glosses
that may serve the demagogue. Most particularly, let no more be
heard of business ethics or morals as the stuff of legal tests for appli-
cation by administrators of uneven capacity and experience. Admis-
sion of the existence of business ethics is just as much an exercise in
encouraging casuistry as is admission of the permissibility of polit-
ical ethics, the ethics of princes, the ethics of the Platonic guardian,
welfare ethics, the ethics of agency policymakers, and the like. They
all come out as "quod licet Jovi non licet bow," which usually means
the powerful are exempted from the rule honored by the humble.
289. See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra. Leading scholar and recent Trade Com-
missioner Robert Pitofsky once was of the opinion that whatever grant of authority was im-
plicit in S&H "is too vague to provide any meaningful enforcement guidelines." Pitofsky,
Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661,
861 (1977).
290. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra. The author more than accepts such a need
and urges that Jefferson's advice must be heeded: "[L]et no more be heard of confidence in
man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of..." far more particularized legisla-
tion. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 252 (1977).
Considered as thoughtfully rather than sloppily composed, the Com-
missioners' letter is an exemplar of this proverb.
There can be no balance between ethics as they apply to indi-
viduals in the usual mode and as they apply to individuals with spe-
cial responsibilities to state, subjects, or company. There can be no
weighing by judges of competing ethical systems. Were courts not
only to indulge such weighing but also to prove educable, it is con-
ceivable that there could be successful advocacy of, say, a Confucian
principle of interdependence as a replacement for either Bellarmine's
casuistry or Aristotle's ethics of prudence. Most of us would fear
letting courts opt among these or other competing ethical systems. If
this be so, how do we dare allow trade commissioners or judges to
deal with or characterize what constitutes ethical conduct in particu-
lar circumstances when we would resist their election of any one of
several competing ethical systems?
Use of language denoting ethicality and morality, or departures
from such norms, has long been common in judicial decisions con-
sidering FTCA.29' Originally, its use was probably prompted by the
very vagueness of section 5(a); judicial resistance to a "we know it
when we see it" pronouncement; a desire to avoid voiding the statute
for vagueness; and ability to adopt meaningful colloquialisms from
an essentially WASP society still sure of its origins, rectitude, and
relatively manifest destiny. It would have been better, however, for
the courts not to have attempted explication by reference to morals
or ethics. The former runs into the "establishment" clause.292 The
latter is essentially meaningless in a pluralistic and materialistic soci-
ety formally indisposed to paternalism, unless it is accepted that all
participants in the society share the same logic or sense of injus-
tice.2 93 Our daily experience, as well as the need for a Trade Com-
mission, rebut universal existence of the same sense of injustice. Our
inability to rely on any universal other than the imperfections of hu-
mankind brings statutory norms into existence. Since imperfect
humans must be used to monitor compliance with many statutory
norms, those norms should be as limiting on discretion of delegates
as is possible for imperfect legislators to draw without consciously
frustrating the constitutional objectives legislators may define.
L Proposal to Amend FTC4
Appended to this article is an undoubtedly imperfect proposal
to amend the heart of FTCA.294 It retains the unfair acts or practices
291. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427.
292. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
293. With apologies to the late Professor Edmond N. Cahn.
294. See text accompanying note 12 supra. Recently, the Commission indicated a disposi-
usage but eliminates reference to unfair methods of competition.
Nevertheless, it endows FTC with jurisdiction over all antitrust laws
and conduct immediately threatening the competitive process al-
though not itself in violation of antitrust laws. The proposal con-
firms Commission jurisdiction over conduct of merchants but
restricts application of the "unfair" label to either (1) situations in
which merchants intend to coerce or materially mislead consumers
or resources or (2) patterns of conduct having effects normally asso-
ciated with coercion or constructive fraud. To address patterns by
analogy to constructive fraud, presumed consumer reliance on gen-
erally recognized legal principles is equivalent to reliance on trade
custom or respondent's conduct.
The proposal is but a beginning. If it or anything like it is sus-
ceptible of adoption, much of the balance of FTCA would require
complementary overhaul.
Whether or not the proposal is susceptible of adoption, the con-
fused state of mind evidenced by recent Commissioners in the De-
cember 1980 epistle to the Senators demands early amendment of
section 5(m) to eliminate any potency for visiting the injunctive con-
sequences of litigation upon persons who were strangers to the
litigation.295
tion to endorse "a more precise statutory standard" regarding the unfair. 1982 Letter, supra
note 261, at 568. Commissioner Pertschuk dissented.
295. See note 223 supra. Supplementing biases disclosed at note 24 supra, the author must
remark recently evolved desires for not only re-erection of a Bureau of Industry Guidance, see
note 31 supra, free of need to produce pelts but also statutory establishment of an F.T.C.
Inspector General to guard against staff excesses.
In late 1981, the bipartisan group of Senators McClure, Melcher, Pressler, Heflin, and
Goldwater offered a bill which inter a/ia would amend FTCA § 5(a)(1) by adding, "For pur-
poses of this Act an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice shall
be an act which causes substantial consumer injury that outweighs the benefits derived from
such act." S. 1984, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., § 6(a). Such extraordinary deference to what sounds
like a cost-benefit analysis can be nothing other than an opening move. Ignoring the obvious
failure to specify to whom the countervailing benefits should run, the necessary practical effect
would be such clogging of Commission calendars as to make the agency virtually useless.
Other interesting features of the bill include virtual exemption of state-supervised "profes-
sions" and, in some instances, their national affiliates, from FTC scrutiny, id at §§ 2 and
3(b)(4); pre-emption of FTC investigatory and prosecutorial powers by the target's demonstra-
tion that it is "acting in conformance with state law", id at §§ 3(a), 3(b)(3), and 7(a); and,
modification of the undoubtedly threatening FTCA § 5(m)(1)(B), the text of which is set forth
at note 223 supra, by mere substitution of United States district courts' determinations for
those of the Commission, id. § 7(c).
The incumbent Commissioners oppose exempting professionals and what the author calls
"reverse preemption". 1982 Letter, supra note 261, at 568-70. It is the author's view that the
bill's address to FTCA § 5(m)(1)(B) is entirely inadequate and that the reverse preemption, as
proposed, is unwise in terms of a federal system and a national economy.
On March 18, 1982, Chairman Miller seemingly endorsed inclusion of a cost-benefit stan-
dard in statutory explication of "unfair." Statement before Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee (available in offices of The Dickinson Law Review). Incorporation
of such a standard in a liability formulation would constitute grievous political error. Not only
would it perpetuate the Pfizer decision's questionable approach to substantive law, see text
accompanying notes 209-10 supra, but it would tend to invite witless extension of adversarial
proceedings. The author would have little difficulty with linking a cost-benefit guideline to
either of two procedural steps: the Commission's determination that the public interest war-
rants prosecution, see text accompanying notes 34, 44, 45 & 46 supra, or the ultimate decision,
after liability is established, concerning appropriateness of an order.
The Administration is disinclined to support S. 1984 !f Congress gives sympathetic consid-
eration to proposals being communicated by FTC Chairman James C. Miller Il. Letter of
March 31, 1982 from David Stockman to Representative James Florio (available in offices of
the Dickinson Law Review).
Appendix I
(a)(1) Unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby
declared unlawful.
A. Unfair acts include (i) actual violations of the antitrust laws
and conduct imminently threatening actual injury to the competitive
process although such conduct does not meet all of the elements or-
dinarily required to prove violation of antitrust statutes; (ii) offerings
by or transactions involving merchants dealing in goods or services,
which offerings or transactions are intended by the merchants to mis-
lead suppliers or consumers as to the nature or price of such goods or
services, or the usual price of such production or services, or per-
formance of such products, or benefits to be expected from receipt,
purchase, lease, possession, or use of such products or services;
(iii) offerings or transactions intended to coerce selection of suppliers
or customers of goods or services; (iv) offerings or transactions in-
tended to materially mislead consumers as to the identity of the im-
mediate, intermediate, and ultimate providers of such goods or
services; and, (v) any other offering by or transaction involving
merchants of goods or services when such a merchant demonstrably
intended or intends directly and substantially to injure either sellers
of such goods or services, or competition (although the offering or
transaction is not itself violative of the antitrust laws), or consumers
through frustrating consumer expectations as to the benefits of
purchased or leased goods or services to the degree such expectations
are based upon affected consumers' reasonable reliance on trade cus-
toms or the conduct of persons alleged to have caused such
expectations.
B. Unfair practices include a pattern of offerings by or trans-
actions involving a merchant or merchants ordinarily dealing in
goods or services, which offerings or transactions, in the contexts in
which they are made by such a merchant, have the effect of either
(i) materially misleading sellers or consumers as to the nature or
price of such goods or services, or the usual prices of such goods or
services, or performance of such products, or benefits to be expected
from receipt, purchase, lease, possession, use, or other enjoyment of
such goods or services; (ii) coercing selection of suppliers or custom-
ers; (iii) otherwise limiting selection of suppliers or customers during
periods of time greater than necessary to protection of the benefits
represented or reasonably anticipated as flowing to actual or poten-
tial parties to such transactions; or (iv) frustrating reasonable expec-
tations of consumers as to benefits to be derived from acquiring such
goods or services to the degree such expectations are explicitly or
implicitly founded on legal principles generally recognized among a
majority of the states (so long as such states include a majority of the
national population), trade or market customs, or the conduct of per-
sons involved in marketing, merchandising, purchasing, or advertis-
ing such goods or services.
C. Unlawfulness of an act or practice characterized as unfair
pursuant to part A or B of this subsection is not subject to proof of
any technical nexus, such as privity of contract, between an offeror
who is in the business of selling, procuring, leasing or otherwise con-
tracting for the acquisition or provision of sales or services, or in the
business of promoting such activity, and (i) those to whom an offer is
actually or constructively communicated, or (ii) those who actually
purchase or lease the offered goods or services from, or supply them
to, a merchant other than the offeror.
D. A person charged with unlawful conduct hereunder shall
not be subject to a cease and desist order to other remedy available
to or at the instance of the Commission if such person shall show
that her or his conduct was undertaken in good faith and without
reasonable grounds to believe that the challenged acts or practices
were unfair; provided, however, that no such defense shall be avail-
able to excuse a violation of the antitrust laws or a trade regulation
rule.
E. For purposes of this section, an offering or transaction that is
misleading in a material respect can be characterized by determining
either (i) that representations made in connection with promoting
the goods or services in question are misrepresentative of a state of
facts or quality of performance that could affect a reasonable per-
son's decision to buy, sell, or lease, or (ii) that a promoter has failed
to state a fact, qualification, or condition of which the omission, in
light of representations made, could affect a reasonable person's de-
cision to buy, sell, or lease.
